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PERSONAL TORTS
Frank L. Branson *
I. NEGLIGENCE
A. DUTY
URING this Survey period, Texas courts have addressed the con-
cept of duty. In Connell v. Payne ' the Dallas Court of Appeals held
that a person involved in a competitive contact sport owes a duty
not to recklessly or intentionally cause injury to other players. Likewise, the
Amarillo Court of Appeals held that golfers will not be held liable for hitting
another player in the head with a golf ball unless the conduct was reckless or
intentional. 2 On the other hand, the court held that liability may be imposed
on the golf course owner. The court reasoned that even in recreational ar-
eas, a possessor of land is liable for physical harm caused to invitees by a
condition on the land if the possessor:
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the con-
dition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm
to such invitees, and
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or
will fail to protect themselves against it, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.3
The Austin Court of Appeals also held that the owner of a parasail can be
held liable absent reckless or intentional conduct when someone is injured
on the equipment.4 The Bangert court distinguished Connell v. Payne on the
grounds that parasailing is not a contact sport. The court declined to adopt
the reckless disregard standard for every recreational activity or sport and
held that the defendant parasail owner owed the plaintiff a duty of ordinary
care in making sure that the parasail was set up properly. 5
Further examining duty, the Austin Court of Appeals held that a drug-
testing laboratory may be held liable to a potential employee for negligent
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1. 814 S.W.2d 486, 487-89 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied).
2. Hathaway v. Tascosa, 846 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, n.w.h.).
3. Id. at 617.
4. Bangert v. Shaffner, 848 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ denied).
5. Id. at 356.
1493
SMU LAW REVIEW
drug testing.6 The laboratory failed to warn the employer that test results
may be inaccurate if the potential employee had ingested poppy seeds. The
court of appeals rejected the defendant's arguments that it had no duty to
the potential employee. The court reasoned that the laboratory created the
dangerous situation by failing to provide pertinent information on the unreli-
ability of the test results.
In Way v. Boy Scouts ofAmerica 7 a twelve-year-old boy died after the gun
he was playing with accidentally discharged. Shortly before the accident,
Way read a supplement on shooting sports published in Boy's Life Maga-
zine. Applying the risk-utility balancing test, the court held that the fire-
arms supplement did not create a duty on the part of defendants to either
refrain from publishing the supplement or to add warnings about the danger
of firearms and ammunition. The court noted that weighing heavily on its
decision were considerations of the pervasiveness of firearms in society
which gives rise to a need for the safe and responsible use of firearms by
minors in conjunction with Boy Scouts and other supervised activities of
significant social utility. The supplement, according to the court, provided
useful information about lawful products.
In Salinas v. General Motors Corp.8 an eighty-nine-year-old woman hit
and killed a person directing traffic in a parking lot. She had purchased the
car one month prior from a salesman who knew that she had previously
driven her car through her garage and hit a tree. The court held that an
automobile manufacturer has no duty to warn drivers or instruct dealers
about the dangers of impaired or elderly drivers. 9
In the area of inter-familial duties, the San Antonio Court of Appeals has
held that no spousal duty exists to take affirmative action to protect the
other from self-injury.' 0 In this case a woman died after ingesting alcoholic
beverages and nerve pills prior to a soak in the hot tub. The court explained
that "In]either spouse has a legal duty to intervene forcibly in the other's
decision when and how much to drink, or whether or how to use a hot
tub." I Although there is no liability for such non-feasance, a spouse may be
liable for intentional or negligent acts resulting in injury. 12
In Apolinar v. Thompson 3 a housesitter sued the homeowner alleging that
the defendant had a duty to warn of dangerous conditions and/or make the
premises reasonably safe. Such a duty existed in this case since the home-
owner had been receiving harassing and threatening phone calls. Specifi-
cally, the court explained that the criminal act of a third party does not
automatically relieve a property owner from liability.' 4 This is particularly
6. Doe v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 855 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ
granted).
7. 856 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ denied).
8. 857 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist] 1993, n.w.h.).
9. Id. at 950.
10. Rampel v. Wascher, 845 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied).
11. Id. at 925.
12. Id.
13. 844 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied).
14. Id. at 264.
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applicable when the property owner has failed to warn after he "knew or
should have realized the likelihood" 1 5 that a dangerous "situation might be
created, and that a third person might commit such a tort or crime.' 16
In Coleman v. United Savings Ass'n of Texas 17 the Fort Worth Court of
Appeals held that a landlord has a duty to install, inspect, or repair a smoke
detector in a tenant's apartment when the tenant makes the appropriate re-
quest. 18 The court affirmed summary judgment by focusing on the Texas
Smoke Detector Statute.19 The court held that summary judgment was ap-
propriate because the deceased tenant had not given notice or made a re-
quest for the defendant to inspect his smoke detector.20 The court reasoned
that the Texas Smoke Detector Statute supersedes common law liability re-
garding smoke detectors.
B. CAUSATION
Proximate cause means that:
cause which, in the natural and continuous sequence, produces an
event, and without which cause such event would not have occurred.
In order to be considered the proximate cause, the act or omission com-
plained of must be such that a person using ordinary care would have
foreseen that event, or some similar event, might reasonably result
therefrom. There may be more than one proximate cause of an event. 2 1
According to the court in Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Ellis22 expert testi-
mony concerning causation in a toxic tort case must be based on a reason-
able medical probability rather than mere possibilities. In this case
conclusions of the plaintiff's experts amounted to speculation because they
were unsupported by scientific studies or other well-founded methodologies.
Although experts relied on past experience in treating patients and published
scientific studies, none of the authorities documented the exact phenomena
at issue.
In Kalteyer v. Sneed 23 the plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice cause
of action based upon res ipsa loquitur. The defendant doctor moved for
summary judgment presenting two affidavits from medical experts in sup-
port of his motion. The plaintiffs offered no expert testimony in response
contending that such evidence was unnecessary due to their reliance on res
ipsa loquitur. The court of appeals stated that res ipsa loquitur is applied
seldomly in medical malpractice cases. 24 Even if res ipsa loquitur were ap-
plied in this case, the court held the defendant was entitled to summary
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 846 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, n.w.h.).
18. Id. at 132.
19. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 92.255, 92.256, 92.258, 92.259 (Vernon 1993).
20. Coleman, 846 S.W.2d at 132-33.
21. 1 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES § 2.04 (1986) [hereinafter
P.J.C.].
22. C14-91-00795-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] 1992, n.w.h.).
23. 837 S.W.2d 848 (Tex.App.-Austin 1992, n.w.h.) (per curiam).
24. Id. at 852.
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judgment because the "[a]pplication of res ipsa loquitur would allow an in-
ference of negligence in the absence of expert testimony that the standard of
care had been breached, but it does not eliminate the need for evidence of
causation."'25 Without any controverting proof, the defendant negated any
issue of material fact regarding causation, thereby entitling him to summary
judgment.
In Neese v. Dietz26 a plaintiff brought suit against another driver who had
rear-ended his car. The accident occurred after the plaintiff stopped at a
yield sign, moved forward, then stopped again. Based upon the evidence, the
jury found in favor of the defendant on the question of liability. The Hous-
ton Court of Appeals affirmed and held that there was sufficient evidence to
support the jury's answer as to proximate cause. Specifically, the court rec-
ognized that "the mere occurrence of a rear-end automobile accident is not
of itself evidence of negligence as a matter of law."' 27 Moreover, "[t]he plain-
tiff must prove specific acts of negligence on the part of the following driver
and must also prove proximate cause." 28
C. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
The Dallas Court of Appeals held that the president of a diagnostic
center, by the mere status of his position, cannot be held personally liable for
the death of a child who was mistakenly given a fatal dose of chloral hy-
drate.29 Since the president did not have any legal duty to institute policies,
procedures, and/or quality control, the court held that the president was not
liable for his alleged negligent hiring of consultants and administrators.
30
Four justices dissented arguing that the president could be held liable if he
chose to hire a manager and consultant without sufficient experience in pro-
viding patient care.3 ' Additionally, he had the ultimate authority to change
personnel and to make decisions. The dissenters asserted that a properly
instructed jury could have found the requisite foreseeability and causation.
In Chevron, US.A., Inc. v. Lee 32 the El Paso Court of Appeals held that
an employer was liable for an employee's actions while he was on a "special
mission." As part of his employment, the employee was required to attend a
seminar. While on his way to the seminar, the employee was involved in an
automobile accident. The court explained that an employee is in the course
and scope of his employment "where an employee has undertaken a special
mission at the direction of his employer or is otherwise performing a service
in furtherance of the employer's business with the express or implied ap-
proval of the employer." '33 Moreover, the court found that a " 'special mis-
25. Id. at 853.
26. 845 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
27. Id. at 314.
28. Id.
29. 852 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ denied) (en banc).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 847 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. App.-E! Paso 1993, n.w.h.).
33. Id. at 356.
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sion' exists when an employee.., is travelling from his home or returning to
it on a special errand either as part of his regular duties or at the specific
order or request of his employer."'34 Accordingly, the court found that suffi-
cient evidence existed to support a finding that this employee was acting
within the course and scope of his employment.
D. DRAM SHOP
Addressing the duty of care owed by businesses and social hosts when
serving alcoholic beverages, the Supreme Court of Texas held that social
hosts do not owe a duty of care to an innocent third party, but providers of
alcohol have such a duty to third parties and the drinker himself. The exist-
ence of a legal duty to protect the general public from a known inebriated
motorist was first recognized in Texas by the Texas Supreme Court in Otis
Engineering Corp. v. Clark.35 The Otis court imposed liability on an em-
ployer who, knowing that his employee was inebriated, took no affirmative
steps to prevent the employee from operating a motor vehicle. 36 Relying on
Otis, many courts have analyzed, interpreted, and developed dram shop lia-
bility in Texas.37
Recently, in Graff v. Beard,38 the Texas Supreme Court declined to im-
pose the duty on a social host for dram shop liability. The court reasoned
the legislature did not include social hosts in the dram shop statutes, thereby
exempting social host cases from the long arm of the statute. Dissenting,
Justice Gammage stressed that the risk created by these social hosts is fore-
seeable and that imposing the duty would be a logical extension of existing
Texas law.
On the other hand, a commercial provider of alcohol owes a greater duty
of care. The provider's liability has been expanded to include the public at
large and the drinker himself.39 The Texas Supreme Court reasoned that
liability under the Dram Shop Act "is premised on the conduct of the pro-
vider of the alcoholic beverages - not the conduct of the recipient or a third
party. The conduct for which the provider may be held liable under Chapter
2 [of the Dram Shop Act] is the same conduct regardless of whether the
intoxicated individual injures himself or a third party." 40 Thus, an individ-
ual or entity who provides, sells, or serves alcoholic beverages in violation of
Chapter 2 of the Alcoholic Beverage Code of the Dram Shop Act may assert
a cause of action against the provider even if he injures only himself. Logi-
cally, the heirs and beneficiaries of a decedent who kills himself may sue the
alcohol provider under the wrongful death and survival statutes.
34. Id.
35. 668 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1983).
36. Id.
37. See El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1987); Pinkham v. Apple Com-
puter, Inc., 699 S.W.2d 387, 389-90 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Poole v.
El Chico Corp., 713 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ refd n.r.e.).
38. 858 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1993).
39. Smith v. Sewell, 858 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. 1993).
40. Id. at 354.
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In Fuller v. Maxus Energy Corp.41 the Waco Court of Appeals held that a
provider of alcohol may be held liable for providing alcohol to a person
eighteen years old or older if it was apparent to the provider that the person
was intoxicated at the time the alcohol was provided. In this case an eight-
een-year-old soldier purchased beer at a service station where the store clerk
did not check any identification. Several hours later, the soldier's vehicle
struck and killed two other soldiers. The trial court granted summary judg-
ment based on evidence that the soldier was not intoxicated when he
purchased the beer. Since there was no evidence of intoxication at the time
of the purchase of the alcohol, the trial court's decision to grant summary
judgment was affirmed. 4 2
E. CRIMINAL CONDUCT BY A THIRD PARTY
In Stephens v. Crowder 43 after the owner had left the keys in the vehicle, a
twelve-year old stole the car and caused a wreck. The automobile owner was
not entitled to summary judgment since a trier of fact must determine
whether it was foreseeable that the vehicle might be stolen. Since no evi-
dence was presented as to whether similar thefts or other criminal acts had
occurred in the area, the defendants failed to negate the foreseeability ele-
ment of negligence, thereby precluding any entitlement to summary
judgment.
F. NEGLIGENCE - DEFENSES
Until recently, the Texas automobile insurance coverage contained a
mandatory family member exclusion. During the Survey period, however,
the Texas Supreme Court struck down the family member exclusion as void
against public policy. 44 The court reasoned that the family member exclu-
sion conflicts with the Texas Safety Responsibility Act as well as public pol-
icy underlying the act.45
In Hall v. Martin 46 a minor filed suit against her mother, father, and step-
father after she was injured in a motorcycle accident. Although the parents
gave the minor permission to ride a moped, the minor decided to ride as a
41. 841 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. App.-Waco 1992, no writ).
42. Id. at 883 (citing TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. §§ 2.02-2.03). Chapter Two of the
Alcoholic Beverage Code (the "Dramshop Act") provides an exclusive remedy for damages
based on the sale of alcohol to a person eighteen years or older, and it provides a cause of
action against a provider of alcohol when "it is apparent to the provider that the individual
being sold, served, or provided with an alcoholic beverage was obviously intoxicated to the
extent that he presented a clear danger to himself and others; and the intoxication of the
recipient of the alcoholic beverage was a proximate cause of the damages suffered."
43. 841 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. App.-Waco 1992, no writ).
44. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Randall Johnson, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 75 (Oct.
27, 1993).
45. Id. The Texas Safety Responsibility Act requires that a driver carry minimum liabil-
ity limits of $20,000 for bodily injury or death of one person in any accident and $40,000
because of bodily injury or death to two or more persons in any accident and $15,000 because
of injury or destruction of property of others in any single accident. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 6701h § 1(10) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
46. 851 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, writ denied).
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passenger on a motorcycle. While riding on the motorcycle, the minor was
injured. Based on these facts, the parents argued that they were "covered
under the doctrine of parental immunity and that they had no duty and
breached no duty, and the accident was not the proximate cause of any act
or conduct on their part."'47 The Beaumont Court of Appeals agreed with
this position. Specifically, the court stated that generally "[p]arental immu-
nity is the law in Texas."4 8 The court acknowledged that there are excep-
tions to the parental immunity doctrine such as:
1. Parental immunity does not apply when a parent commits a willful,
malicious, or intentional wrong against a child or abandons or abdicates
his parental responsibility and thereby subjects himself or herself to
liability.
2. Texas does not apply the parental immunity doctrine when the act
complained of arises outside of a normal family relationship of a parent
to a child, such as a business activity in which the child is the employee
and the parent is the employer.
3. The third exception to the parental immunity doctrine allows a
child to recover against a negligent parent for damages caused by the
negligent parent in operating a motor vehicle.49




The Texas legislature recently passed legislation creating new duties relat-
ing to certain rental dwellings.5 ° This legislation went into effect on Septem-
ber 1, 1993. As a result, landlords now have the duty to install certain
security devices even before a tenant makes such a request. For example, a
landlord must install window latches on exterior windows, as well as install
door knob locks or keyed dead bolts on each exterior door.5 '
In addition, a landlord must install "a sliding door pin lock, a sliding door
handle latch, or a sliding door security bar on each exterior sliding glass
door of the dwelling, if construction of the dwelling was completed on or
after September 1, 1993, or the calendar date is before January 1, 1995.1'52 If
construction of the dwelling was completed on or after September 1, 1993, or
the calendar date is January 1, 1995, or later, the landlord must install a
sliding door pin lock and a sliding door handle latch or a sliding door secur-
ity bar on each exterior sliding door.53 Moreover, a landlord must install a
47. Id. at 908.
48. Id. at 909.
49. Id.
50. Act of May 30, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 357, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. § I (Vernon)
(to be codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92,001) (Vernon 1993).
51. Id. § 92.153(1)-(2).
52. Id. § 92.153(3).
53. Id. § 92.153(4).
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peep hole/door viewer on each exterior door of a dwelling built after Sep-
tember 1, 1993.
Additionally, a landlord has the duty to rekey any security device at the
landlord's expense not later than the seventh day after each tenant turnover
date.54 The landlord is also required to make any additional changes in ex-
isting security devices at the tenant's expense, if so requested by the tenant. 5
Furthermore, the landlord has the duty to repair or replace a security device
on request or notification by the tenant that the device is not working or in
need of repair or replacement. 56
The legislature also has specified that a landlord must comply with a ten-
ant's request for rekeying, changing, installing, repairing, or replacing a se-
curity device under this section within a reasonable time.57 In some
situations, a reasonable time period is presumed to be not later than seventy-
two hours after the request. This occurs, for example, in situations where
the tenant's request followed an unauthorized entry or crime of personal
violence which occurred within the tenant's apartment complex. 58
B. CASE LAW
An unavoidable accident instruction is improper in almost all premises
liability cases. In Hill v. Winn Dixie59 the plaintiff slipped and fell on a
cookie in the defendant's store, and the trial court submitted a jury instruc-
tion defining unavoidable accident. "An unavoidable accident instruction is
proper only when there is evidence that the event was proximately caused by
a nonhuman condition and not by the negligence of any party to the
event."' 6 The Texas Supreme Court held that submission of an unavoidable
accident instruction was error because there was no affirmative evidence that
the cookie was on the floor as the result of any extrinsic, unavoidable event
such as an act of God.61
In Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Buenrostro62 the railroad leased a por-
tion of a right of way to a telecommunications company which hired a sub-
contractor to clear the land. The sub-contractor was injured on the property
and filed suit against the railroad company. The San Antonio Court of Ap-
peals adopted the definition of possession of land contained in the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 328e and held that the railroad did not have
possession of the land. The railroad company's only rights were to have the
ongoing rail transportation activities on the right of way. Since this control
was insufficient to constitute possession, the railroad did not have a duty of
54. Id. § 92.156(a).
55. Id. § 92.156(b).
56. Id. § 92.158.
57. Id. § 92.161(a).
58. Id. § 92.161(c).
59. 849 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1992).
60. Id. at 803.
61. Id. Nevertheless, the court held that under the circumstances of this particular case
the error was not reversible. Id.
62. 853 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, writ denied).
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care with respect to that portion of the right of way. As a result, the plaintiff
was not entitled to recover against the railroad under a premises liability
theory.63
The San Antonio Court of Appeals held that a person who had been kid-
napped and raped upon returning to her car may recover from the owner of
the parking lot where the car was located.64 The parking lot operator may
be liable for criminal activity that occurs in the parking lot if the operator
knew or had reason to know that criminal acts were likely to occur on or
near the property. 6 The injury must be of such a general character as might
reasonably have been anticipated. It is not required that the particular acci-
dent complained of should have been foreseen. 66
On the other hand, unforeseeable criminal activity may relieve the land-
owner of liability. 67 In Graham the plaintiff alleged sexual harassment and
sued the defendant, claiming that the company owed her a duty to maintain
a work environment free of sexual harassment. The court of appeals held
that a superseding and unforeseeable act will relieve the landowner of liabil-
ity. Since the defendant company had no reason to believe that sexual har-
assment would likely occur by this individual employee, no duty existed. 68
III. PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE
A. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM
Senate Bill 1409 became effective as of September 1, 1993, and supple-
mented and extended the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement
Act 69 to August 31, 2009.70 Among the supplementations are new proce-
dural requirements and arbitration requirements. 7'
Under the new statute, the plaintiff must either post a $2,000 bond with
the court to cover costs or file, within 90 days of filing a medical malpractice
action, an affidavit attesting that an expert in the appropriate field has been
consulted and has concluded that the defendant was negligent and proxi-
mately caused the plaintiff's injuries. Failure to comply with one of these
options will result in an increased bond requirement of $4,000 or dismissal of
the complaint without prejudice, costs adjudged against the plaintiff.
Additionally, Section 13.02 directs the Texas Supreme Court to appoint
six people to a Health Care Liability Discovery Panel established to promul-
gate standard sets of interrogatories and requests for document production.
63. Id. at 80.
64. Kendrick v. Allright Parking Tex., Inc., 846 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1992, writ denied).
65. Id. at 457.
66. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management, 690 S.W.2d 546, 551 (Tex. 1985); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448 (1965).
67. Graham v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 848 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993,
writ denied).
68. Id. at 753.
69. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i (Vernon 1993).
70. Id. §§ 13.01-.02.
71. Id. §§ 13.01-.02, 15.01.
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The Texas Supreme Court has until January 1, 1994, to approve, disapprove,
or modify the standardized documents. If disapproved, or if the panel re-
jects any modifications, the proposals will be null and void and the panel
dissolved. If approved and published, all parties to a medical malpractice
action filed after April 4, 1994 will be required to respond to the standard
interrogatories and requests for production. Failure to do so will be sanc-
tionable. Non-duplicative discovery will still be allowed.
Concerning arbitration, all agreements to arbitrate health care liability
claims must include the following notice in 12 point boldface type:
UNDER TEXAS LAW, THIS AGREEMENT IS INVALID AND OF
NO LEGAL EFFECT UNLESS IT IS ALSO SIGNED BY AN AT-
TORNEY OF YOUR OWN CHOOSING. THIS AGREEMENT
CONTAINS A WAIVER OF IMPORTANT LEGAL RIGHTS, IN-
CLUDING YOUR RIGHT TO A JURY. YOU SHOULD NOT
SIGN THIS AGREEMENT WITHOUT FIRST CONSULTING AN
ATTORNEY.
Failure to meet the requirements will invalidate the arbitration clause.
B. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE - DUTY
In Jaime v. St. Joseph Hospital Foundation 72 a patient received a blood
transfusion at the defendant hospital and later contracted AIDS. The Hous-
ton Court of Appeals upheld summary judgment for the defendant hospital
since the evidence demonstrated that the hospital met the standard of care at
the time of the 1982 blood transfusion in dispute.
In Hand v. Tavera 73 the plaintiff went to the Humana Hospital's emer-
gency room complaining of a three-day headache. Pursuant to hospital pol-
icy, the emergency room physician consulted with another doctor. The
consulting doctor refused to admit the patient. Shortly thereafter, the plain-
tiff suffered a stroke. The court of appeals reversed summary judgment find-
ing that a physician-patient relationship existed. The court held that "when
•.. the plan's doctor on call is consulted about treatment or admission, there
is a physician-patient relationship between the doctor and the insured" and
"the doctor owes the patient a duty of care." '74
In Pope v. St. John 75 the Austin Court of Appeals held that a doctor as-
sumes a legal duty to act with ordinary care regardless of whether he volun-
tarily undertakes this duty. In this case a man came to a medical center
seeking medical relief. The emergency room doctor contacted the on-call
internist who recommended that the patient be referred to another hospital
with a neurosurgeon. The other hospital refused to admit the man. The
following day, the man was diagnosed with having meningitis. The man
sued the on-call internist alleging that his negligence was a proximate cause
of his suffering and disabilities. The court of appeals acknowledged that at
72. 853 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, n.w.h.).
73. No. 04-92-00618-CV (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, n.w.h.).
74. Id.
75. 862 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ requested).
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common law "a physician is liable for malpractice or negligence only where
there is a physician/patient relationship as a result of a contract, express or
implied.. .,76 The court rejected the defendant's argument that he owed a
duty only to those with whom he contracted. In this case, evidence was
presented showing that the doctor failed to perform his duties with ordinary
care, which resulted in misidentification of the plaintiff's ailment. Accord-
ingly, the court held the doctor had a duty to act as a reasonable and pru-
dent person would act under the same or similar circumstances regardless of
any contractual relationship. 77
In Lopez v. Aziz 78 a patient's surviving husband and children brought a
medical malpractice action against an obstetrician who had consulted with
the patient's treating physician. This patient was admitted to a hospital and
was under the supervision of her treating physician while she awaited the
delivery of her eleventh child. During this time, her treating physician con-
sulted by telephone with an OB-GYN specialist. Following his conversa-
tions with this specialist, the treating physician acted upon the advice he had
been given. Within the next day or two, complications developed and an
emergency cesarean section was performed after which the patient soon
died. In light of the facts of this case, the San Antonio Court of Appeals
held that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the
obstetrician. 79 The court must determine whether a physician patient rela-
tionship existed and whether this obstetrician owed any legal duty to Mrs.
Lopez. The court considered the following facts: the treating physician had
not contracted with this obstetrician to perform any services for Mrs. Lopez,
he did not conduct any laboratory tests, he did not review any test results, he
did not prepare any reports, and he did not bill Mrs. Lopez or the treating
physician. The court concluded that the obstetrician did nothing more than
answer professional questions posed to him by a colleague. Specifically, the
court stated, "[t]o expose physicians such as ... [this defendant obstetrician]
to liability for simply conferring with a colleague would be detrimental in
the long run to those seeking competent medical attention and is contrary to
the public policy of this state."18 0 Lastly, the court focused on the fact that
the treating physician was ultimately responsible for the treatment of Mrs.
Lopez and was not bound to accept or follow the opinions of the consulting
doctor.
C. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE - EXPERT TESTIMONY
In St. Paul Medical Center v. Cecil 8 a negligence action was brought
against the attending physician and a hospital. The jury found that the neg-
ligence of the nurse and hospital proximately caused the child to become
brain damaged. On appeal, the defendants argued that no standard of care
76. Id. at 658.
77. Id. at 660.
78. 852 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, n.w.h.).
79. Id. at 305.
80. Id. at 307.
81. 842 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ).
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was established which resulted in the jury's findings being based on conjec-
ture. The Dallas Court of Appeals, however, rejected such arguments and
explained:
In medical malpractice cases, breach of duty normally is established
through expert testimony that the health care provided fell below the
standard of care applicable to the medical practice in question ....
However, the standard of non-medical, administrative, ministerial, or
routine care at a hospital need not be established by expert testimony
because the jury is competent from its own experience to determine and
apply such a reasonable-care standard.8 2
Lastly, the court held "that expert testimony was not necessary to establish
that the hospital was negligent in retaining, supervising, and assigning the
nurse."
8 3
D. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE - LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT
In Greene v. Thiet 84 the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that a doctor
is not liable for failing to disclose a risk to a patient if the non-disclosed risk
did not cause injury. The patient originally brought suit alleging that her
doctors failed to inform her of the increased risk of complications from si-
multaneous surgeries. The court of appeals explained that in a medical mal-
practice action premised on the lack of informed consent, the plaintiff must
prove that a reasonable person would have refused the treatment or that
informing the patient of the inherent risks would influence such a decision
and that the ultimate injury was caused by the undisclosed risk. As a result,
the court reasoned that "the defendant-physician's failure to disclose is not a
cause of the patient's injury if the patient was not injured by the occurrence
of the risk of which he was not informed." 85
E. LEGAL MALPRACTICE
In Maxey v. Morrison 8 6 the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals defined the
elements of legal malpractice occurring during an appeal. Specifically, ap-
pellant sued his former attorney after his appeal in another action had been
dismissed for want of prosecution. The court held that "[i]n an appellate
legal malpractice suit, the claimant is required to prove that, but for the
attorney's negligence, he would have prevailed on the appeal." 87
In Rhodes v. Batilla 88 a Houston Court of Appeals defined the standard of
care applied in a legal malpractice case. The court of appeals stated that
82. Id. at 812.
83. Id. at 813.
84. 846 S.W.2d 26 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied), modified, No. 04-92-
00154-CV (Tex. App.-San Antonio January 13, 1993, n.w.h.) (Even though the plaintiff's
denial of being informed of increased risk probably raises a fact issue on the breach of duty to
inform element, disposition of the case on the proximate cause element renders such fact issue
immaterial).
85. Id. at 30.
86. 843 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied).
87. Id. at 770.
88. 848 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
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generally "[a] lawyer in Texas is held to the standard of care which would be
exercised by a reasonably prudent attorney, based on the information the
attorney has at the time of the alleged act of negligence." 8 9 In this case the
defendant attorney held himself out as a "tax expert." Accordingly, the
court of appeals held that the trial court properly instructed the jury that
this attorney should be held "to the standard of care which would be exer-
cised by a reasonably prudent tax attorney." 90
In American Centennial Insurance v. Canal Insurance91 the Texas
Supreme Court determined whether an excess insurance carrier has a cause
of action for mishandling litigation and/or violating the Stowers Doctrine
against a primary carrier and the attorneys it hired. In addressing this issue,
the Texas Supreme Court recognized that "Texas law vests a clear right in
the insured to sue the primary carrier for a wrongful refusal to settle a claim
within the limits of the policy."'92 Likewise, an excess insurer stands in the
shoes of the insured and may bring an equitable subrogation action against
the primary carrier. 93 Without the doctrine of equitable subrogation, an ex-
cess insurer, having paid the claim against its insured to avoid breaching its
own Stowers duty, would have no recourse against the primary insurer or its
agents for tortious conduct in handling the claim. Thus, "[a]llowing the ex-
cess insurer to enforce the primary insurer's duty to settle in good faith
serves the public and judicial interest in fair and reasonable settlements of
lawsuits by discouraging primary carriers from gambling with the excess
carrier's money when potential judgments approach the primary insurer's
policy limits."' 94 Accordingly, the excess insurer may seek damages under
common law, the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and/or the Insur-
ance Code for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, breach of the
Stowers duty, and/or tortiously handling the underlying cause of action.
95
The Texas Supreme Court also considered whether a non-client, excess
insurance carrier could bring a malpractice action against the attorneys
hired by the primary insurer. 96 After considering this issue, the court ex-
plained that "considerations that have resulted in our recognizing an excess
carrier's right to bring an equitable subrogation action against the primary
insurer offer similar support for an action by the excess carrier against de-
89. Id. at 843.
90. Id.
91. 843 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. 1992).
92. Id. at 482.
93. Id. at 483.
94. Id. at 483 (quoting Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Medical Protective Co., 393
N.W.2d 479, 483 (Mich. 1986)).
95. See Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129, 134 (Tex. 1988) (the
insurer's breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing may result in recovery under the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 680 S.W.2d 595 (Tex.
App.-Tyler 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (violating the Stowers duty results in a violation of the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and the Insurance Code).
96. American Centennial, 843 S.W.2d at 484; Ranger County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Guin, 723
S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1988) (insurer and its agents, such as attorneys, are liable for tortiously
handling a claim and/or violation of the Stowers Doctrine).
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fense counsel."' 97 Accordingly, the Texas Supreme Court abolished the priv-
ity requirement and permitted suit against the defense attorneys.
In contrast, the Houston Court of Appeals declined to abolish the privity
requirement to permit suit by a third-party beneficiary of an attorney-client
relationship. 98 The defendant attorneys represented several members of tes-
tator's family and companies owned by the family. The most significant as-
set in the estate was the stock of one of the family owned corporations.
According to the beneficiaries, the trustee and the attorneys unsuccessfully
attempted to defraud the beneficiaries into selling their stock for book value.
The beneficiaries filed suit against the attorneys. The trial court granted
summary judgment for defendants and the court of appeals affirmed. The
court of appeals held that the plaintiffs, as beneficiaries of the estate, had no
cause of action against the attorneys because no attorney-client relationship
existed. 99 Although the court acknowledged that a fiduciary relationship
may sometimes exist between the beneficiary of a trust and the trustee, such
a relationship did not exist in the instant case.
IV. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
As of September 1, 1993, products liability legislation went into effect in
Texas. Section 82.002 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code im-
poses a duty on manufacturers to indemnify innocent sellers against financial
loss resulting from products liability causes of action. Additionally, the leg-
islation eliminates liability where the product at issue was inherently unsafe
or a common consumer product intended for personal consumption. The
personal consumption section covers items such as sugar, tobacco, and but-
ter. In a design defects case, § 82.005 requires the plaintiff to prove that
there was a safer alternative design which was economically and logistically
feasible.
As the recipients of special consideration by the legislature, manufacturers
of firearms and ammunition will be protected against having to defend prod-
ucts liability cases which are based simply on the argument that the risks
versus the benefits of firearms proves that liability should fall on the manu-
facturer. Section 82.006 mandates that such arguments will not establish the
requisite proof.
Unless otherwise guaranteed by the manufacturer, all products liability
causes of action must be brought within 15 years of the date of sale.
B. PRODUCTS LIABILITY - DUTY
In Rolen v. Burroughs Wellcome Co. 100 the Waco Court of Appeals de-
97. American Centennial, 843 S.W.2d at 484.
98, Thompson v. Vinson & Elkins, 859 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1993, writ denied).
99. Id. at 620.
100. 856 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. App.-Waco 1993, writ denied).
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fined the duty that a drug manufacturer owes to potential users of one of its
products. In this case a patient suffered an allergic reaction to a drug pre-
scribed by his doctor. The patient sued the drug manufacturer claiming it
failed to adequately warn him of the dangers associated with this drug. The
court recognized that a drug manufacturer has a duty to adequately warn
the doctor of the dangers associated with the drugs it markets, but the manu-
facturer has no such duty to warn the patient. I'1 In turn, the doctor as-
sumes this duty to warn the patient of the dangers associated with the
prescribed drug. 102 In light of this legal reasoning, the court of appeals af-
firmed summary judgment for the defendant drug manufacturer.
V. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. STANDARDS FOR AWARDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Since the Code of Hammurabi of approximately 2,000 B.C., Hittite law
around 1400 B.C., and the Hindu Code of approximately 200 B.C., civiliza-
tions have imposed civil penalties and damages for reprehensible or quasi-
criminal conduct.'0 3 Like its ancient counterparts, modern jurisprudence
authorizes the imposition of exemplary damages to deter and punish inten-
tional or conscious conduct beyond the standard of ordinary negligence.'°4
Texas courts have consistently imposed punitive damages for conduct
which is wilful, wanton, malicious, or the result of actual conscious indiffer-
ence to the rights, safety, and/or welfare of the injured person or general
public. 105 In addition, punitive damages are intended to reimburse the
plaintiff for remote losses such as inconvenience and attorneys' fees.
0 6
101. Id. at 609.
102. Id.
103. K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.2(a)(1) (1980).
104. Genay v. Norris, I S.C.L. (1 Bay) 6 (1784); Coryell v. Colbaugh, I N.J.L. 77 (1791);
Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851) (when determining punitive damages, the jury is
instructed to consider the gravity of the wrong and the need to deter similar conduct); Louis
Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Yeldell, 274 U.S. 112 (1927) (imposing punitive damages upon a
corporation when its agents commit intentional fraud creates a strong incentive for vigilance
by those in a position to guard against the evil to be prevented); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991) (punitive damages achieve the important societal goals of punish-
ment and deterrence).
105. See, e.g., Lunsford v. Morris, 746 S.W.2d 471, 471-72 (Tex. 1988) (punitive damages
are also assessed to deter future misconduct, punish wrongdoers, and to reimburse the plaintiff
for remote losses); Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1985) (puni-
tive damages are intended to punish the defendant and set an example for others); Hofer v.
Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470, 471 (Tex. 1984) (punitive damages punish and deter similar wrong-
ful conduct); Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 920 (Tex. 1981) (punitive damages
punish and deter malicious, fraudulent, or grossly negligent conduct); Armco Steel Corp. v.
Jones, 376 S.W.2d 825, 831 (Tex. 1964) (deterrence and punishment are achieved by the impo-
sition of punitive damages); see also TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.001(5)
(Vernon 1993) (gross negligence is defined as "such an entire want of care as to establish that
the act or omission was the result of actual conscious indifference to the rights, safety, or
welfare of the person or persons affected").
106. Lunsford v. Morris, 746 S.W.2d 471, 471-72 (Tex. 1988); Cavnar v. Quality Control
Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549, 555-56 (Tex. 1985); Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470, 474-75
(Tex. 1984); Browning-Ferris Indus. Inc., v. Lieck, 845 S.W.2d 926, 946 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1992, writ granted); Celotex Corp. v. Tate, 797 S.W.2d 197, 209 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1990, no writ). Thus, punitive damages are intended not only to deter and punish the
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Texas jurisprudence distinguishes ordinary negligence from gross negli-
gence based upon the mental attitude of the defendant. 0 7 Unlike the case in
chief where the focus is on the plaintiff, the evidence must focus squarely on
the defendant's conduct in order to prove punitive damages. State of mind
may be inferred from the defendant's acts or omissions. 10 8 The Texas
Supreme Court is considering whether the Burk Royalty standard should be
affirmed, modified, or overruled. 10 9
Punitive damages may also be assessed against a corporation or principal
because of an act of an agent if: (a) the principal authorized the doing and
the manner of the act; (b) the agent was unfit and the principal was reckless
in appointing him; (c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and
was acting in the scope of employment; or (d) the employer or a manager of
the employer ratified or approved the act." 0 Texas law also imposes puni-
tive damages for a breach of a non-delegable duty. Some non-delegable du-
ties include, but are not limited to: (1) the duty to provide rules and
regulations for the safety of employees and to warn them, under certain con-
ditions, of the hazard of their position; (2) the duty to furnish reasonable safe
machinery and/or instrumentality with which servants are to labor; (3) the
duty to furnish its servants with a reasonably safe work place; and (4) the
duty to exercise ordinary care in selecting careful and competent fellow ser-
vants or co-employees."'I A breach of one of those duties does not require
wrongdoer but to compensate the plaintiffs additional remote losses which are too remote to
be considered as elements of strict compensation.
107. Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Aim, 785 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1990) (the plaintiff is enti-
tled to punitive damages when he shows that the defendant was consciously and knowingly
indifferent to his rights, welfare and safety), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 847 (1990); Birchfield v.
Texarkana Memorial Hosp., 747 S.W.2d 361, 365 (Tex. 1987) (evidence of the defendant's
subjective knowledge of the peril created by his conduct is admissible to prove gross negli-
gence); Williams v. Steves Indus., Inc., 699 S.W.2d 570, 573 (Tex. 1985) ("conscious indiffer-
ence" denotes a decision, in the face of impending harm to another party, not to care about the
consequences of the act which may ultimately lead to that harm); International Armament
Corp. v. King, 686 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. 1985); Burk Royalty Co., 616 S.W.2d at 922 (the plaintiff
must show the defendant knew about the peril but that his acts or omissions demonstrate a
want of care); John Deere Co. v. May, 773 S.W.2d 369, 373 (Tex. App.-Waco 1989, writ
denied); Terminix, Inc. v. Right Away Foods Corp., 771 S.W.2d 675, 681 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1989, writ denied) (the plaintiff may prove gross negligence by showing that the de-
fendant had actual knowledge that his conduct created an unreasonable degree of risk, or that
under the surrounding circumstances a reasonable person would have realized that his conduct
created an extreme degree of risk to the safety of others); American Cyanamid Co. v. Frank-
son, 732 S.W.2d 648, 657-58 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (the defend-
ant's state of mind distinguishes gross negligence from negligence).
108. Burk Royalty, 616 S.W.2d at 922.
109. Transportation Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 814 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ
granted); Granite Constr. Co. v. Mendoza, 816 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ
denied).
110. King v. McGuff, 149 Tex. 432, 234 S.W.2d 403, 405 (1950); Hylander v. Groendyke
Transp., Inc., 732 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christ 1987, writ rerd n.r.e.); South-
ern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Harlow, 729 S.W.2d 946, 952 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ
denied); Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Dawson, 662 S.W.2d 740, 743 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
111. Otis Elevator Co. v. Joseph, 749 S.W.2d 920, 926 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.]




ratification.' 1 2 Accordingly, a corporation may be subject to punitive dam-
ages for the acts and/or omissions of its servants and/or vice-principals for
breach of non-delegable duties whether or not such duties have been ratified.
B. PROVING PUNITIVE DAMAGES BY A PREPONDERANCE
OF THE EVIDENCE
In Texas punitive damages may be awarded if the plaintiff proves fraud,
malice, or gross negligence by a preponderance of the evidence." 13 Regard-
less of the standard applied, the jury has discretion, although not unbridled,
to assess punitive damages in an amount it determines is reasonable under
the circumstances and in accordance with the proper instructions of the trial
court. This decision is reviewable to determine whether the award comports
with due process.' 14 Additionally, the courts must determine whether the
punitive damage award satisfies the five factors set forth in Alamo National
Bank v. Kraus:' '5 (1) the nature of the wrong; (2) the character of the con-
duct involved; (3) the degree of culpability of the wrongdoer; (4) the situa-
tion and sensibilities of the parties; and (5) the extent to which the
defendant's conduct offends the public's sense of justice and propriety.
Applying the Alamo test, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals recently
affirmed a punitive damage award which was three times greater than actual
damages. In Greater Houston Transportation v. Zrubeck 116 the jury
awarded a fifty-three-year-old quadriplegic $175,000 in actual damages and
$500,000 in exemplary damages when the defendant transportation com-
pany failed to restrain the plaintiff in his wheelchair with a seat belt. 1 7
While considering the reasonableness of the award, the Corpus Christi Court
of Appeals stated:
Exemplary damages primarily serve to punish the wrongdoer and to
provide an example to other potential wrongdoers .... Thus, the fair-
ness of the award from the standpoint of the injured party is but a sec-
ondary consideration. . . . The determination of the amount of
exemplary damages to be awarded should depend upon the facts of a
case and remain largely within the sound discretion of the jury."18
The court also applied the Alamo factors and held that the punitive damage
award was reasonably proportional to the actual damages." 9 Prior courts
112. Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 923-24 (Tex. 1981); Otis Elevator Co. v.
Joseph, 749 S.W.2d 920, 926 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
113. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003 (Vernon 1993); Browning-Ferris In-
dus., Inc. v. Lieck, 845 S.W.2d 926, 946 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ granted) (due
process does not require a higher standard of proof than preponderance of the evidence); Law-
son-Avila Constr., Inc. v. Stoutamire, 791 S.W.2d 584, 593 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990,
writ denied); Ford Motor Co. v. Durrill, 714 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986),
writ granted on other grounds and vacated, 754 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. 1988).
114. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
115. 616 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Tex. 1981).
116. 850 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied).
117. Id. at 581.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 593.
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have held that such a proportion was reasonable in other cases. 120 In addi-
tion, even if the ratio had been greater than three-to-one, the court stated
that it still would have reached the same conclusion applying the five Alamo
factors.
C. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The jury's right to award punitive damages has withstood constitutional
challenges on both the state and federal level. 121 In those cases, the defend-
ants asserted that the punitive damage awards violated the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the prohibition against excessive
fines contained in the Eighth Amendment and their state counterparts.
Under constitutional scrutiny, the United States Supreme Court has held
that punitive damage awards will not violate the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment as long as the jury does not have unlimited or un-
bridled discretion in setting the award. 122 In Haslip the Court reviewed Ala-
bama law in connection with a judgment for over $1,000,000 which included
a punitive damages award of more than four times the amount awarded as
compensatory damages, and more than 200 times the out-of-pocket expenses
of the employee who was awarded the largest amount. The court deter-
mined that Alabama's scheme for awarding punitive damages did not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment because the jury was instructed that punitive
damages were not to compensate the plaintiff for any injury but were in-
tended to punish the defendant and protect the public by deterring such acts.
As a result, the jury properly exercised its discretion by awarding an appro-
priate amount of damages for the purpose in which it had been instructed. 1 23
The Court noted that unbridled jury discretion, without sufficient safe-
guards, "may invite extreme results that jar one's constitutional
sensibilities." 124
In TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp. 125 the United States
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a jury's award of $19,000
in actual damages and $10,000,000 in punitive damages against the defend-
ant. In this case the plaintiff brought a common-law slander of title action
after the defendant acted in bad faith and attempted and advanced a claim
based on an allegedly worthless quit claim deed, all in an effort to renegotiate
an existing royalty arrangement. Based on the jury's award, the Court con-
sidered whether such a punitive damage award ratio of 526 to I violates the
120. Delta Drilling Co. v. Cruz, 707 S.W.2d 660, 667 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
121. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991); Browning-Ferris Indus. of
Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989); General Chem. Corp. v. Gonzalo de la
Lastra, 852 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. 1993), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 490 (1993); General Motors
Corp. v. Saenz, 829 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 37
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 176 (1993); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Zubiate, 808 S.W.2d 590 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied).
122. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
123. Id. at 21.
124. Id. at 20.
125. 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
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due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and its holding in Haslip.
The Court determined that the punitive damages award was reasonable and
constitutional and stated that "[i]t is appropriate to consider the magnitude
of the potential harm that the defendant's conduct would have caused to its
intended victim if the wrongful plan had succeeded, as well as the possible
harm to other victims that might have resulted if similar future behavior
were not deterred."' 26 After considering the specific facts of the case, the
Supreme Court held that this award of punitive damages was not unreasona-
ble. The dissent argued that no punitive damage award could be held uncon-
stitutional under the Court's reasoning and holding.1
27
Texas has various procedural safeguards in force to ensure that the de-
fendant's due process rights are not violated. For example, juries are in-
structed that exemplary damages mean "an amount that you may in your
discretion award as an example to others and as a penalty or by way of
punishment, in addition to any amount that you may have found as actual
damages."' 128 Like the juries who decided Haslip and TXO, Texas juries are
instructed as to the purpose and intent of punitive damages before they de-
cide whether and in what amount to award. 12 9 Additionally, Texas courts
analyze the punitive damages award based upon the five Alamo factors. The
jury must arrive at a figure that is reasonably related in amount to the actual
damage award based upon the Alamo factors.1
3 0
Moreover, the Texas legislature has imposed additional safeguards by cap-
ping punitive damage awards for gross negligence to four times actual dam-
ages or $200,000, whichever is greater. 13' This cap was intended to ensure
that the amount of punitive damages was rationally related to actual
damages.
Since Texas law provides defendants with ample substantive and proce-
dural protections to ensure that the jury does not exercise unbridled discre-
tion and award unlimited damages, the Texas system operates within the
confines of due process.' 32 In Zubiate the El Paso Court of Appeals held
that the jury's award of punitive damages did not violate due process be-
cause the jury had been effectively constrained and the defendant was pro-
tected by procedural safeguards of Texas law. 133 The court reasoned that
the defendant's due process rights had been protected through the applica-
tion of the Alamo factors. 134
126. Id. at 2722.
127. Id. at 2742.
128. P.J.C., supra note 19, § 7.06.
129. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21 (1991).
130. Id.
131. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.007 (Vernon 1993).
132. See General Chem. Corp. v. Gonzalo de la Lastra, 852 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. 1993), cert.
dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 490 (1993); General Motors Corp. v. Saenz, 829 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 7 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 176 (1993); State Farm Mutual
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Zubiate, 808 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied).
133. Zubiate, 808 S.W.2d at 603 (citing Pacific Mut. Life Ins. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991)).
134. Zubiate, 808 S.W.2d at 603-04; Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Lieck, 845 S.W.2d
927, 946 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied) (punitive damage award did not vio-
late the state or federal constitution because the jury was instructed as to its reason for impos-
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In 1992, the Texas Supreme Court was again faced with determining the
constitutionality of punitive damages.1 35 The court, however, refused to
pronounce method, means, manner, and amount of punitive damages as
vague or violative of the defendant's rights to due process as guaranteed by
Article I, § 19 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. Instead, it relied upon § 41.007 of the Texas
Civil Practices and Remedies Code and reduced the amount of punitive
damages because the award exceeded the statute's 4:1 ratio. 136
Three significant punitive damage cases have recently or are currently
pending before the Texas Supreme Court. 137 In these cases the court is con-
sidering whether the Burk Royalty standard still should be applied and
whether the Texas or United States Constitutions were violated by the impo-
sition of punitive damages.
In Saenz the court of appeals held that the Texas procedure for assessing
punitive damages does not violate the United States Constitution. The court
specifically explained that Texas procedure for awarding punitive damages
tracks the common law method approved by the United States Supreme
Court in Haslip and involves proper jury instructions concerning the objec-
tive of punitive damages. 138 Further, the court of appeals reviewed the evi-
dence and determined the jury's award of punitive damages comported with
the Alamo factors.' 3 9 If the damages appear excessive, the defendant may
object and present arguments in a motion for new trial, take an appeal of
right, or take a discretionary appeal to the Supreme Court of Texas or the
Supreme Court of the United States.' 40 As a result, there was no constitu-
tional violation.
Finally, the Saenz court rejected the argument that the assessment of pu-
nitive damages violated the Texas Constitution, Article I, § 19 and specifi-
cally held that: (1) punitive damages may be awarded based upon a
preponderance of the evidence rather than a higher standard such as clear
and convincing evidence; (2) admission of evidence of defendant's wealth is
permitted in assessing punitive damages; and (3) the gross negligence stan-
dard is clearly defined and not unconstitutionally vague.' 4 1 Although the
ing punitive damages); General Motors Corp. v. Saenz, supra, note 113 (in addition to the
Alamo factors, when reviewing a punitive damage award, the court may consider the fre-
quency of the wrongs committed and the size of an award needed to deter similar wrongs in
the future).
135. General Chem. Corp., 852 S.W.2d 916 (Hecht, J., concurring and dissenting).
136. Id. at 580.
137. General Motors Corp. v, Saenz, 829 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991),
rev'd on other grounds, 7 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 176 (1993); Transportation Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 814
S.W.2d 144 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ granted); Granite Constr. Co. v. Mendoza, 816
S.W.2d 756 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ requested) (the court of appeals held that the jury
was properly instructed and constrained, had given consideration to the proper factors as set
forth in Alamo, and reached a verdict that was neither excessive nor unreasonably propor-
tioned to actual damages).
138. Saenz, 829 S.W.2d at 241.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 248.
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Texas Supreme Court granted points of error related to General Motors'
duty to warn, it may decide other preserved issues such as the constitutional-
ity of punitive damages under the state and federal constitutions.
These pending cases do not raise novel issues. In addressing the constitu-
tionality of exemplary damages, the trend established by lower courts has
been to follow guidelines set forth by both the United Stated Supreme Court
and the Texas Supreme Court. However, the Texas Supreme Court may use
these cases to modify the Burk Royalty standard and the constitutional
analysis.
When addressing the excessive fines issue, the United States Supreme
Court has held that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to punitive dam-
age awards between private parties. 142 Under the Texas Constitution, lower
courts have held that protection against excessive fines does not apply to an
award of common-law punitive damages. 143
The Texas Supreme Court has also addressed the constitutionality of civil
penalties and excessive fines. 144 In Pennington the court held that a civil
penalty is not unconstitutional or excessive unless it becomes "so manifestly
violative of the constitutional inhibition as to shock the sense of man-
kind."' 145 The Pennington court further explained that the analysis of possi-
ble excesses by the jury involves a determination of whether the amount was
fixed with reference to the object it is to accomplish according to the serious-
ness of the wrong and the defendant's culpability.
Few courts have found punitive damage awards to be so excessive as to
amount to a shock to the conscience. For example, the $3 billion punitive
damage award in Texaco v. Pennzoil Co. was reduced to $1 billion on appeal,
which apparently brought the judgment well within the Texas constitutional
limits on excessive fines. 146 Multiple awards of punitive damages do not
violate due process or equal protection. 147
142. Browning-Ferris Indus. Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
143. Celotex Corp. v. Tate, 797 S.W.2d 197, 208 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no
writ).
144. Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 690 (Tex. 1980).
145. Id. (quoting State v. Laredo Ice Co., 96 Tex. 461, 73 S.W. 951, 953 (1903)).
146. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App.-Houston 1987, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 994 (1988) (the court noted that it reduced the award based
upon the more restrictive New York law and implied that Texas law may not have required
any remittitur); see also Edwards v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 911 F.2d 1151, 1155 (5th
Cir. 1990) (multiple punitive damage awards did not violate the Texas or United States Consti-
tutions even if "Celotex's liability for punitive damages imperils its ability to pay compensatory
claims and its corporate existence"); K-Mart Corp. v. Pearson, 818 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ) (a punitive damage award of $2.2 million did not shock the
sensibilities of mankind even though the total damage award constituted eighty percent of the
defendant store owner's net worth).
147. Glasscock v. Armstrong Cork Co., 946 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1991) (no constitutional
violation occurred although the jury awarded punitive damages which were twenty times the
actual compensatory damages), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1778 (1992); Fiberboard Corp. v. Pool,
813 S.W.2d 658, 686-87 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, writ denied) (multiple awards of puni-
tive damages which jeopardize the financial stability of the company do not violate the sub-
stantive or procedural due process protections afforded by the United States and Texas
Constitution), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct 3037 (1993).
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D. TORT REFORM - UP TO THE CEILING AND BEYOND
Except for worker's compensation cases, an award of punitive damages is
dependent first on the existence of an actual damage award. 14 Once that
threshold has been crossed, the jury has discretion to award punitive dam-
ages in accordance with the trial court's instructions. 149
The common law principles that guide courts in policing judgments for
possible jury excesses are flexible and require no strict rules or ratios that
limit recovery.150 The ratio of punitive to actual damages will be considered
only as one factor in the determination of reasonableness. The Alamo fac-
tors must be considered.'51
The Texas legislature enacted a statutory cap limiting punitive damages,
not predicated by a finding of malice or intentional conduct, to four times
actual damages. Section 41.007 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies
Code states:
41.007. Limitation on Amount of Recovery
Except as provided by Section 41.008, exemplary damages awarded
against a defendant may not exceed four times the amount of actual
damages or $200,000, whichever is greater.152
Applying § 41.007, the Texas Supreme Court recently reduced a punitive
damages award that exceeded the four to one ratio limit. 153 On the other
hand, § 41.008 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code expressly ex-
empts the punitive damage cap for awards based upon malice or intentional
conduct.154 Although the term "intentional tort" is not statutorily defined,
the legislative history indicates that there is no punitive damage cap "in fac-
tual scenarios where a product manufacturer makes an economic decision to
the effect that it would be cheaper to pay off tort judgments than to take
remedial or warning steps."' 155 Unlike the term "intentional torts," the term
"malice" is defined by the statute to mean "an act that is carried out by the
148. See Wright v. Gifford-Hill & Co., Inc., 725 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. 1987) (in a worker's
compensation case, punitive damages are available without a finding of actual damages); Cas-
tleberry v. Goolsby Bldg. Corp., 617 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Tex. 1981) (a worker is entitled to
punitive damages without a finding of actual damages). The legislature has codified that re-
quirement to necessitate an actual damage award of more than a mere nominal amount. TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.004(a) (Vernon 1992).
149. Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470, 471 (Tex. 1984); Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616
S.W.2d 911, 920 (Tex. 1981); Alamo Nat'l Bank v. Kraus, 616 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. 1981).
150. Browning Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989); Transpor-
tation Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 814 S.W.2d 144, (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ granted); Alamo,
616 S.W.2d at 910. The punitive damage award must be reasonable in relation to the amount
of actual damages. Alamo, 616 S.W.2d at 910; see also Tatum v. Preston Carter Co., 702
S.W.2d 186 (Tex. 1986).
151. Alamo, 616 S.W.2d at 910.
152. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.008 (Vernon 1992).
153. General Chem. Corp. v. Gonzalo de la Lastra, 852 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. 1993), cert.
dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 490 (1993).
154. Transmission Exch. Inc. v. Long, 821 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1991, writ denied) (since fraud was successfully proven, the punitive damage cap did not apply
and the award exceeding the four to one ratio was upheld); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM, CODE
ANN. § 41.008 (Vernon 1992).




defendant with a flagrant disregard for the rights of others and with actual
awareness on the part of the defendant that the act will, in reasonable
probability, result in human death, great bodily harm, or property dam-
age." 5 6 Thus, in product liability causes of action, such as asbestos or the
much publicized Ford Pinto and GM saddle side gas tank cases, the cap on
punitive damages does not apply. Although there is no cap on these cases,
the jury's award must still comport with the trial court's instructions and the
Alamo factors. 157
If the facts support a finding that the tortfeasor acted intentionally or with
malice, the plaintiff should plead the same and submit proof and jury ques-
tions. If the jury returns a punitive damage verdict exceeding the four to one
ratio for an intentional tort or malicious conduct, the trial or appellate
courts should not reduce the award so long as it is supported by the evidence
and the defendant is afforded substantive and procedural protections. 158
E. AWARDING DTPA PENALTIES AND PUNITIVE
DAMAGES SIMULTANEOUSLY
In most product liability causes of action, the plaintiff will also have a
claim for breach of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The DTPA
provides a laundry list of acts which constitute violations, including but not
limited to, any conduct which is either false or has the capacity or tendency
to mislead or deceive the ignorant, unthinking, and credulous, 159 and pass-
ing off goods or services as those of another. 16 Pursuant to the DTPA, it is
unlawful for a person or entity to engage in conduct which is false, mislead-
ing, or deceptive whether or not it falls into the specifically enumerated sec-
tions contained in the statute's laundry list. 16 1 It is also unlawful to breach
an express or implied warranty, to commit any unconscionable action or
course of action by any person, or to violate article 21.21 of the Texas Insur-
ance Code. 162 The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act authorizes the im-
position of treble damages if the finder of fact determines that the person or
company acted knowingly and engaged in false, misleading or deceptive acts
or practices. 163
Remedies authorized under the DTPA are cumulative of those provided
156. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.001(6)(B) (Vernon 1992).
157. Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470, 471 (Tex. 1984); Alamo Nat'l Bank v. Kraus, 616
S.W.2d 908 (Tex. 1981); Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 920 (Tex. 1981).
158. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 864-65 (Tex. App.-Houston, writ
ref'd n.r.e.), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 994 (1988); Hofer, 679 S.W.2d at 471; Alamo, 616 S.W.2d
at 908; Burk Royalty Co., 616 S.W.2d at 920; K-Mart Corp. v. Pearson, 818 S.W.2d 410, 416-
17 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1991, no writ).
159. Chrysler Plymouth City, Inc. v. Guerrero, 620 S.W.2d 700, 705 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1991, no writ).
160. Milt Ferguson Motor Co. v. Zeretzke, 827 S.W.2d 349, 354-55 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1991, no writ) (finding that the standard, quality, grade, style, or model of the goods
or services were not of the particular quality that they were represented to be); TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46 (Vernon 1992).
161. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (Vernon 1992).
162. Id.
163. Id. § 17.50(b)(1).
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by other laws. 164 In a claim involving product liability and DTPA allega-
tions, the plaintiff may recover both statutory penalties and exemplary dam-
ages so long as the charge submitted contains separate and distinct damage
questions to the jury on both the product defect and the false, misleading or
deceptive act or practice. 16 5
In order to preserve recovery under both the DTPA and common law
punitive damages, the plaintiff must present separate and distinct questions
as to whether multiple acts occurred and whether those acts were the pro-
ducing cause of the plaintiff's damages. 166 Although the Texas Supreme
Court refused to allow a plaintiff to recover both DTPA treble damages and
punitive damages without a finding of separate and distinct acts and dam-
ages, the Court held that "where the prevailing party fails to elect between
alternative measures of damages, the court should utilize the findings afford-
ing the greater recovery and render judgment accordingly."' 167
In short, the Texas Supreme Court has authorized the simultaneous impo-
sition of punitive damages and DTPA statutory penalties on a finding that
separate and distinct acts and damages occurred. 168 So long as there are
separate findings under both the product liability theory and DTPA, both
punitive and statutory penalties are recoverable.169
F. COMPARATIVE FAULT AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Punitive damages shall not be reduced proportionately to the percentage
164. Id. § 17.43; Kish v. Van Note, 692 S.W.2d 463, 466-67 (Tex. 1985).
165. Birchfield v. Texarkana Memorial Hosp., 747 S.W.2d 361, 367 (Tex. 1987); Berry
Property Management, Inc. v. Bliskey, 850 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ
dism'd) (the plaintiff may recover both statutory treble damages and exemplary damages based
upon findings of fact of separate and distinct acts and damages); Winkle Chevy-Olds-Pontiac,
Inc. v. Condon, 830 S.W.2d 740, 744 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ dism'd) (the
plaintiff proved separate acts and damages to support his award of DTPA treble damages and
punitive damages, thereby allowing recovery for both simultaneously); Orkin Exterminating
Co. v. Williamson, 785 S.W. 905, 912-13 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, writ denied) (awarding
both exemplary damages and attorney's fees was proper even though the verdict did not in-
clude separate and distinct findings of actual damages upon which the awards could be
predicated).
166. Birchfield v. Texarkana Memorial Hosp., 747 S.W.2d 361, 367 (Tex. 1987).
167. Id.; see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 680 S.W.2d 595, 606 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (without separate and distinct finding, punitive damages and statutory penalties are
predicated upon the same actual damages findings and would amount to a double recovery);
see also Mayo v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Boston, 711 S.W.2d 5, 6 (Tex. 1986). But
see Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Williamson, 785 S.W.2d 905, 912-13 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990,
writ denied) (award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees under the DTPA was proper
even though the verdict did not include separate and distinct findings of actual damages upon
which the awards could be predicated).
168. Birchfield, 747 S.W.2d at 367; Mayo, 711 S.W.2d at 6-7; TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 17.43 (Vernon 1992) ("The provisions of this subchapter are not exclusive. The reme-
dies provided in this subchapter are in addition to any other procedures or remedies provided
for in any other law; provided, however, that no recovery shall be permitted under both this
subchapter and another law of both actual damages and penalties for the same act or
practice").
169. Birchfield, 747 S.W.2d at 367; Berry Property Management, 850 S.W.2d at 665; Orkin,
785 S.W.2d at 912-13.
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of negligence attributed to the plaintiff. 170 In order to achieve the deterrent
and punitive goals of exemplary damages, courts will not reduce the plain-
tiff's award by his own comparative fault. However, it is unlikely that courts
will allow a plaintiff, who is found to be more than fifty percent negligent to
recover punitive damages. 171
G. DISCOVERY AND ADMISSIBILITY OF NET WORTH
The Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly held that evidence of defend-
ant's net worth is discoverable and admissible in cases involving punitive
damages.1 72 In order to achieve the dual goals of deterrence and punish-
ment, the jury should consider the net worth of the defendant. 173 In addi-
tion, evidence of net worth is admissible to show that the company had the
financial ability to provide proper facilities and/or equipment to prevent the
plaintiff's injuries. 174
VI. WRONGFUL DEATH
A. LIMITATIONS ON A DECEDENT'S HEIRS TO PROSECUTE A
WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION
The Texas Supreme Court in Russell v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. 175 modified the
statute of limitations for a decedent's heirs to prosecute a wrongful death
action. The cornerstone of the holding was that wrongful death actions are
derivative of the decedent's rights. 176 The court held that a wrongful death
action exists only if the decedent, at the time of his death, could have
170. Elbar, Inc. v. Claussen, 774 S.W.2d 45, 53 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ dism'd)
(since the purpose of awarding exemplary damages is not to compensate the plaintiff but to
punish and set an example for others, exemplary damages should not be reduced proportion-
ately to the percentage of negligence attributed to the plaintiff); Turner v. Lone Star Indus.,
Inc., 733 S.W.2d 242, 242-43 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Olin
Corp. v. Dyson, 709 S.W.2d 251, 253 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
171. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.001(a) (Vernon 1992) (claimant is
barred from recovering actual damages for negligence if the claimant is more than fifty percent
negligent); Id. § 41.004(a) (punitive damages must be predicated upon a finding of actual, not
nominal damages); see also Mayo v. Tri-Bell Indus., Inc., 787 F.2d 1007, 1011-12 (5th Cir.
1986).
172. Lunsford v. Morris, 746 S.W.2d 471, 472 (Tex. 1988) (civil defendant's net worth is
relevant to the issue of punitive damages, thereby making it discoverable and admissible);
Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Lieck, 845 S.W.2d 927, 946 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992,
writ granted) (since punitive damages are intended to punish and deter, evidence of net worth
is admissible); General Motors Corp. v. Saenz, 829 S.W.2d 230, 248 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1991), rev'don other grounds, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 176 (1993) (since one of the purposes
of punitive damage awards is to deter future misconduct, evidence of net worth is relevant to
determining the amount of such award); Delgado v. Kitzman, 793 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ) (when the plaintiff alleges punitive damages, evidence of net
worth is discoverable); Hanna v. Meurer, 769 S.W.2d 680, 681 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, no
writ).
173. Lunsford, 746 S.W.2d at 472 (the degree of punishment and deterrence resulting from
the judgment is to some extent in proportion to the means of the guilty person); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (cmt. e) (1977).
174. Birchfield v. Texarkana Memorial Hosp., 747 S.W.2d 361, 366 (Tex. 1987).
175. 841 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. 1992).
176. Id. at 345.
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brought suit for his own injuries. If no such right existed at the time of the
decedent's death, no wrongful death action is available to the decedent's
heirs. 177
In Russell the decedent contracted a terminal disease from silica exposure
in 1981. Russell filed suit for his injuries in 1982 against several defendants.
In 1988, Russell amended and added various additional defendants. Shortly
thereafter, Russell died. His heirs then brought suit in their individual and
representative capacities for wrongful death and survival causes of action.
In 1988, the district court granted summary judgment for the additional de-
fendants based upon the statute of limitations because suit was filed more
than two years after the decedent knew or should have known that he was
injured. The Texas Supreme Court held that the decedent would be barred
by the statute of limitations from suing the additional defendants. Likewise,
those making derivative claims under the wrongful death and survival stat-
utes are barred as well. 178 His heir and beneficiaries, however, could main-
tain their claims against all tortfeasors who were sued prior to 1983.
In a strong dissent, Justice Doggett pointed out that the majority's hold-
ings would prejudice plaintiffs who die from lingering injuries and would in
effect require a decedent's family to file a wrongful death suit before the
decedent has died. 179 Additionally, he noted the inequities in holding that
Russell's wrongful death and survival causes of action lapsed five years
before his death.
B. Loss CHANCE OF SURVIVAL
In Kramer v. Lewisville Memorial Hospital 180 the Texas Supreme Court
decided to recognize a cause of action for loss of chance of survival when the
adverse result probably would have occurred anyway. In Kramer a physi-
cian failed to timely diagnose the plaintiff's cervical cancer. The court held
that the loss of chance of survival was not available because even with a
proper diagnosis the plaintiff had less than a 50% chance of survival based
upon reasonable medical probabilities. Further, the court found that the
Wrongful Death Statute did not authorize a loss chance of survival action
because: (1) The Act allows recovery only for injuries that cause death; and
(2) The Act only authorizes claims for actions that actually cause death.' 81
The court refused to recognize the loss of chance of survival as part of the
common law, thereby refusing to recognize the action under the Survival
Statute. The court held that the lost chance action was not viable because
courts cannot reward a plaintiff until an ultimate harm occurs which would
be death in this case.182 The court said that by accepting the lost chance
doctrine, the law would be rewarding plaintiffs when there is only a mere
177. Id. at 348.
178. Id. at 345.
179. Id. at 352 (Doggett, J., dissenting).
180. 858 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. 1993).
181. Id. at 404.
182. Id. at 405.
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possibility that a tortfeasor's negligence caused of the ultimate harm. 8 3
VII. EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
A. NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
In Boyles v. Kerr ' 84 the Supreme Court of Texas held that Texas law does
not recognize a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
In this case Boyles videotaped a sexual encounter with Kerr and showed the
videotape around campus. At trial the jury awarded Ms. Kerr monetary
damages and the court of appeals affirmed.' 85 The Texas Supreme Court
reversed and remanded the case for a new trial reasoning that Kerr could
not recover based on the jury verdict because:
[t]he tort system can and does provide a remedy against those who en-
gage in such conduct. But an independent cause of action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress would encompass conduct far less outra-
geous than that involved here, and such a broad tort is not necessary to
allow compensation in a truly egregious case such as this.1 86
Boyles overruled St. Elizabeth Hospital v. Garrard,187 which recognized an
independent right to recover for negligently inflicted emotional distress. The
Texas Supreme Court further held that it was not limiting the right to re-
cover mental anguish damages in other contexts such as a breach of another
legal duty. ' 88
In Weirich v. Weirich 189 a mother brought suit against the father and
paternal grandmother of her children, based on their having allegedly kid-
napped the children. Specifically, the suit was based on claims of intentional
and negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional and negligent inter-
ference with child custody, and for violations of the Family Code's child
custody provisions. Based on the jury's findings, the trial court rendered
judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $5,947,684.89.
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed and rendered a take nothing
judgment. 90 The San Antonio Court of Appeals stated that "we agree that
Texas does not recognize common law causes of action for negligent interfer-
ence with family relationship or negligent infliction of emotional distress
183. Id.
184. 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993).
185. Boyles v. Kerr, 806 S.W.2d 255, 261 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1991), rev'd, 855 S.W.2d
593 (Tex. 1993).
186. Boyles, 855 S.W.2d at 602. On rehearing, the Texas Supreme Court withdrew the
original majority opinion and substituted one with the same holding. In the original opinion,
the court held that "[tiort law cannot and should not attempt to provide redress for every
instance of rude, insensitive or distasteful behavior, even though it may result in hurt feelings,
embarrassment, or even humiliation." See Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993). After
much public outcry, this offensive language was omitted from the holding.
187. 730 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1987) (recognizing independent tort of negligent infliction of
emotional distress).
188. Boyles, 855 S.W.2d at 594.
189. 833 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. 1992).
190. Weirich v. Weirich, 796 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990), rev'd, 833
S.W.2d 942 (Tex. 1992).
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within the context of the facts this case presents.. ."19g Based on its under-
standing of Texas law, the court of appeals also held that "Texas does not
recognize an independent cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional
distress in the context of a child abduction case. .. 192 The court of appeals
did acknowledge that the intentional interference with the relationship of
parent and child is actionable in the State of Texas.19 3
When the Texas Supreme Court reviewed this case, it did not focus on the
above issues. Instead, the court addressed claims arising under the Family
Code and, as a result, held that "we do not reach and express no opinion on
the correctness of the court of appeals' writing on negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress and negligent interference with a family relationship." 94
B. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
In Twyman v. Twyman 195 the Supreme Court of Texas decided whether a
claim for the infliction of emotional distress could be brought in a divorce
proceeding. In Ms. Twyman's divorce petition, she made a claim for emo-
tional harm based on the allegation that her husband, William, "intention-
ally and cruelly attempted to engage her in deviate sexual acts."' 196 At the
conclusion of a bench trial, the court granted Ms. Twyman a divorce and
awarded her $15,000 for her claim of emotional distress.
The Texas Supreme Court acknowledged that it recently refused in Boyles
v. Kerr to recognize the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. Re-
gardless of the decision in Boyles, the supreme court stated that the broad
nature of Ms. Twyman's claims for emotional distress might constitute a
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 197 The Texas Supreme
Court adopted the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress as con-
tained in the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 46 (1965): (1) the de-
fendant acted intentionally or recklessly, (2) the conduct was extreme and
outrageous, (3) the actions of the defendant caused the plaintiff emotional
distress, and (4) the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was
severe. 1
98
Texas became the forty-seventh state to recognize such an action. 199
Moreover, the court held that such a claim could be brought in a divorce
proceeding. 2°° As a result, the court reversed and remanded case to the trial
court so that it could be determined whether the elements of intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress were present.
191. Id. at 515.
192. Id. at 516.
193. Id.
194. Weirich, 833 S.W.2d at 946. Note that this case was decided prior to the holding of
Boyles v. Kerr.
195. 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993).
196. Id. at 620.
197. Id. at 621.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 621-22.
200. Id. at 625.
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C. BYSTANDER RECOVERY FOR MENTAL ANGUISH
In Garcia v. San Antonio Housing Authority 201 the San Antonio Court of
Appeals considered whether an uncle who witnessed his nephew's injury
could recover for his own mental anguish as a bystander. The trial court
granted summary judgment because the uncle had no standing to seek such
recovery. The court of appeals held that: "neither a close personal relation-
ship nor the uncle-nephew relationship without more is sufficient for recov-
ery as a bystander. But we conclude that a relative residing in the injured
person's household may recover as a bystander, and we therefore reverse the
take-nothing summary judgment. '20 2
The court adopted the bright line test whereby relatives residing in the
same household as the victim will be considered as being closely related to
the victim so as to allow them to potentially recover as a bystander.20 3
Based on this holding, the court reversed and remanded to determine
whether the uncle resided in the same household as the nephew.
D. MENTAL ANGUISH DAMAGES
In Pietila v. Crites 204 the Supreme Court of Texas reviewed a medical mal-
practice action involving the negligent treatment of a pregnant automobile
accident victim. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's negligent treat-
ment resulted in the death of the plaintiffs' unborn child. The court of ap-
peals held that parents have a common law negligence claim for damages
based on the death of a fetus.205 The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the
judgment of the court of appeals and affirmed the summary judgment on
behalf of the doctor. The court held that "mental anguish damages for the
parents are not recoverable when the only asserted cause of action is negli-
gence towards the fetus." 206 On the other hand, plaintiffs are entitled to
bring a common-law claim to recover for their own mental anguish arising
out of the treatment or injury of the mother "but they are precluded from
bringing suit for their mental anguish arising out of the treatment or injury
of their unborn child. ' 207
VIII. LIBEL AND SLANDER
A. DEFAMATION AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
In Schauer v. Memorial Care Systems 208 an employee nurse brought suit
against her employer hospital and her former supervisor based on libel, as
well as intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The plain-
201. 859 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, n.w.h.).
202. Id. at 79.
203. Id. at 81.
204. 851 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. 1993).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 186.
207. Id.
208. 856 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1993, n.w.h.).
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tiff alleged that the defendants made negative statements in her job review.
The trial court granted summary judgment and the court of appeals af-
firmed. While reviewing the statements made in this nurse's evaluation, the
court of appeals stated that the plaintiff had to show that the hospital "pub-
lished defamatory matter about her in the appraisal, which injured or im-
peached her reputation. ' 20 9 Moreover, the court recognized that "[a]
statement may be false, abusive, unpleasant, and objectionable to the plaintiff
without being defamatory .... An expression of opinion is protected free
speech .... The real question is whether the statement is an assertion of fact
or opinion. '2 10 Within these parameters, the court agreed with the defend-
ants' arguments that the statements in dispute were "truthful, permissible
expressions of opinion, or alternatively, not capable of a defamatory mean-
ing."'2 11 Furthermore, the court stated that:
Accusations or comments about an employee by her employer, made to
a person having an interest or duty in the matter to which the commu-
nication relates, have a qualified privilege .... The privilege is not lost,
so long as one believes in the truth of the communication .... A com-
munication loses its privilege if it was made with malice or want of good
faith. 2 12
Since the facts indicated that the communication was privileged and since no
evidence of malice was offered, there was no actionable libel.213
The court next addressed the plaintiff's claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. After reviewing the elements that must be present for
such a claim, the court concluded that the conduct in this case could not be
viewed as "outrageous. ' 21 4 Moreover, the plaintiff failed to offer any evi-
dence indicating she suffered severe emotional distress. In light of the facts
that the plaintiff's performance evaluation was given only to her immediate
supervisor and that it was not made known to any of her co-workers, no
such requisite outrageous conduct existed. Lastly, the facts simply did not
support a claim of severe emotional distress.
B. MALICE AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS
In Johnson v. Southwestern Newspapers Corp.215 a high school football
coach and his wife instigated a libel suit against a newspaper and sports
writer. Essentially, this dispute arose after the defendants published an arti-
cle critical of the plaintiff and his football team which claimed that the plain-
tiff's team generally engaged in unsportsmanlike conduct. Moreover, the
article claimed that the plaintiff ignored the conduct of his players and as a
result, many coaches felt the plaintiff was a detriment to high school
athletics.
209. Id. at 446.
210. Id. at 446-47.
211. Id. at 447.
212. Id. at 450.
213. Id,
214. Id. at 451.
215. 855 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, writ denied).
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The trial court concluded that the plaintiff was a public official; therefore,
a showing of actual malice was required. Finding no malice, the trial court
granted summary judgment. After its own review of the facts, the Amarillo
Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment because the evidence estab-
lished that the plaintiff was a public official due to his status as the school's
athletic director and head football coach and the public responsibilities ac-
companying these two positions. Based on the plaintiff's "status as a public
official and the fact that the Newspaper's article related to this official con-
duct ... [the plaintiffs] cannot recover damages for a defamatory falsehood
unless they prove the falsehood was made with actual malice, i.e., made with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false."'2 16 Based on this legal standard and the fact that the defendant had
offered evidence to negate actual malice, the court felt there was no evidence
to indicate "that the Newspaper made a false and defamatory statement of
fact with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not."'2 17
IX. INVASION OF PRIVACY
A. ELEMENTS OF THE TORT OF INVASION OF PRIVACY
In Valenzuela v. Aquino 2 18 the Texas Supreme Court outlined the ele-
ments of the tort of invasion of privacy. In this case, the plaintiffs, Dr.
Eduardo Aquino and his family, sued picketers who protested outside of
their home. The defendants targeted Dr. Aquino's home to protest his per-
formance of abortions. The plaintiffs based their action on the theories of
negligent infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy. At the trial
court, the plaintiffs were awarded damages and defendants were perma-
nently enjoined from picketing within a certain distance of the plaintiffs'
home. The court of appeals reversed the award of damages but affirmed the
injunction. 219
Based on the holding of Boyles v. Kerr220 the Texas Supreme Court ruled
that the trial court's judgment could not be sustained on a theory of negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress. The court next reviewed the elements
for invasion of privacy and held it occurs when: "(1) an intentional intru-
sion, physically or otherwise, upon another's solitude, seclusion, or private
affairs or concerns, which (2) would be highly offensive to a reasonable per-
son." 22 1 Since the plaintiffs did not request that these invasion of privacy
elements be submitted to the jury and the evidence did not conclusively es-
tablish the cause of action, 222 important factual issues were not resolved. As
a result, no relief could be granted based on the theory of invasion of pri-
216. Id. at 187 (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)).
217. Id. at 188.
218. 853 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1993).
219. Valenzuela v. Aquino, 763 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 853 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1993).
220. 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993).




vacy. Therefore, the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals'
decision to set aside the trial court's award of damages and remanded the
case to the trial court for a new trial. 223
B. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
In Anonsen v. Donahue224 the plaintiff brought an invasion of privacy suit
after his grandmother revealed on national television that her husband had
raped her daughter and the daughter gave birth to the plaintiff. During the
program, the defendant did not reveal the name of her husband, daughter, or
grandson. She, however, did reveal her own name. Due to such conduct,
the plaintiff argued that his own identity had essentially been revealed as
well, resulting in the general public's knowledge of this incestuous rape and
the truth concerning his birth. The trial court granted summary judgment
in favor of all defendants.
The Houston Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and
stated:
the protection of the individual must be balanced with the privilege of
the press to give publicity to matters of public interest that arise out of
the desire and the right of the public to know what is going on in the
world and the freedom of the press and other information agencies to
report it.225
Additionally, the court stated the plaintiff must prove the following elements
to establish the tort of invasion of privacy: "(1) publicity was given to mat-
ters concerning the plaintiff's private life; (2) the matters made public would
be highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities; (3) the
matters publicized were not of legitimate public concern. ' 226
In arriving at its decision, the court focused on the third element required
for a claim of invasion of privacy. When determining whether the publicized
matter was of legitimate public concern, the court must determine whether
such information is newsworthy and protected by the First Amendment.
The court determined that the general subjects of incest and rape were in
fact newsworthy and protected by the First Amendment. 22 7 Additionally,
information about this rape and incest was not publicized by a third party
but by a party actually involved and affected. An individual's personal story
is his or hers to tell and "revelations of private facts about others involved in
their lives . . .[are] protected by the First Amendment. ' 228 Additionally,
the court stated that "we conclude that to allow a cause of action based upon
... [this defendant's] truthful and undisguised account of her own and her
family's experience is inconsistent with the First Amendment. ' 229
223. Id.
224. 857 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
225. Id. at 702.
226. Id. at 703.
227. Anonsen, 857 S.W.2d at 704.




C. FALSE LIGHT INVASION OF PRIVACY
In Diamond Shamrock Refining v. Mendez230 an employee brought suit
against his former employer based on allegations that the former employer
had circulated information about the employee's termination. The employee
alleged that his former employer's conduct constituted the torts of false light
invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. At the
trial court level, the jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff on both theories
of tort liability. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment based upon the
false light theory but ruled there was no evidence to support the jury's ver-
dict as to the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.23'
Before addressing the specific elements of the tort of false light invasion of
privacy, the Texas Supreme Court first stated that "[t]his court has never
expressly held that a tort for false light invasion of privacy exists in Texas,
although we have recognized that it is one of the four usual categories of
private actions for invasion of privacy. ' 232 The court, however, refused to
determine whether such a tort exists in Texas since this issue was not before
the court. Rather, the court held that "if the tort of false light invasion of
privacy exists in Texas, it requires a showing of actual malice as an element
of recovery. ' 233 Therefore, based on the plaintiff's failure to establish this
element of a claim for false light, the court reversed the decision of the court
of appeals and remanded for a new trial. 234
X. GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY
A. NEW DEVELOPMENTS
In Texas Department of Mental Health v. Petty 235 the court considered
the definition of tangible personal property within the meaning of the Texas
Tort Claims Act. In this case a woman had been wrongfully institutional-
ized by state authorities for fifty-two years in the state's mental health sys-
tem. The Texas Supreme Court held that the state is not immune from
liability for misdiagnosis and mistreatment of an institutionalized patient. 236
A governmental entity may be liable for damages resulting from use and/or
misuse of tangible personal property.237 In this case Opal Petty was consist-
ently misdiagnosed as mentally ill and mildly mentally retarded. The state
conceded negligence but argued that no liability should flow from such negli-
gence because the plaintiff was not injured through the use of any property.
The state's argument failed to convince the court that the only way the
230. 844 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. 1992).
231. Diamond Shamrock Ref. and Mktg. Co. v. Mendez, 809 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1991), affid in part and rev'd in part, 844 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. 1992).
232. Diamond Shamrock, 844 S.W.2d at 200.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. 848 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. 1992).
236. Id.
237. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021(2) (Vernon 1993); Robinson v. Cen-




plaintiff could have been injured by her treatment records was if the paper
actually impacted and injured her body.
The court based its holding on its prior unanimous decision in Salcedo v.
El Paso Hospital Dist. 238 The Salcedo court held that the plaintiff could re-
cover against a governmental physician who negligently interpreted readings
from electrocardiograph equipment. 239 Misinterpreting the electrocardio-
graph documents amounted to a misuse of tangible personal property.
Under the Texas Torts Claims Act, the plaintiff is not required to show that
the physical property had injured decedent but rather, that its use, misuse,
or nonuse caused injury. 240
B. IMMUNITY OF POLICE OFFICERS
In Vasquez v. Hernandez241 the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that a
police officer is protected by qualified immunity from liability arising from a
suspect's death. In this case, a police officer responded to a "911" emer-
gency call about a family disturbance which possibly involved a gun. Once
the police officer arrived at the address, the suspect approached the police
officer. Despite being ordered to stop and drop what appeared to be a gun,
the suspect continued to approach the officer. As a result, the officer shot
and killed the suspect. Later, it was determined that the object in the sus-
pect's hand was a screwdriver and not a gun.
The police officer and the City of San Antonio filed motions for summary
judgment. The motions, however, were denied by the trial court. On ap-
peal, the court applied the following legal standards:
A police officer is entitled to qualified immunity if he is acting in good
faith within the course and scope of his authority, and performing dis-
cretionary functions .... Discretionary actions are those which require
personal deliberation, decision, and judgment, while ministerial actions
require obedience to orders or performance of a duty as to which the
actor is left no choice. 242
The court reviewed expert testimony establishing that the officer was en-
gaged in a discretionary act and had acted in a reasonable manner and in
good faith. Moreover, the court acknowledged that "[g]overnment officers
have a common law immunity from personal liability while performing dis-
cretionary duties in good faith within the scope of their authority. ' 243 Based
on the legal standards, the evidence presented and the lack of controverting
proof, the court reversed the denial of the motion for summary judgment as
to the police officer. 244
In the City of Houston v. Newsom 24 5 a bystander was injured by a stray
238. 659 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. 1983).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. 844 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
242. Id. at 804.
243. Id. at 805.
244. Id. at 806.
245. 858 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, n.w.h.).
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bullet either during a shoot-out or after a police officer's gun accidentally
discharged in an ensuing struggle. At the time, the officer was attempting to
prevent an armed suspect from escaping. Subsequently, the plaintiff by-
stander alleged that the officers were negligent and failed to act with ordi-
nary care under the circumstances. Also, he alleged that the city was
negligent through the conduct of its employees.
The court of appeals explained that "[e]mployees of governmental entities
are not subject to the waiver of immunity provided by the Texas Tort Claim
Act to the extent that individual immunity from a tort claim exists."' 24 6 The
court next acknowledged that officials, like these police officers, "have a
common-law immunity from personal liability while performing discretion-
ary duties in good faith within the scope of their authority. ' 247 In addition,
the court pointed out that "[a] plaintiff must defeat one or more of the ele-
ments of the affirmative defense of official immunity once the defendant es-
tablishes a prima facie case for its application. '248 Since the plaintiff failed
to controvert any of these listed elements of official immunity, the court re-
versed the denial of summary judgment. 249
In Edgar v. Plummer 250 the court of appeals addressed the issue of gov-
ernmental immunity in regards to the detention of an automobile driver. In
this case two police officers pulled over a motorist who was driving five miles
an hour above the legal speed limit and who had crossed the right shoulder
line. Although no speeding ticket was issued, the officers issued a written
warning for the driver's failure to drive in a single lane. Based on the of-
ficer's conduct and the Department of Public Safety's investigation of this
matter, the plaintiff filed suit for false arrest and for negligent investigation
of the complaint he had filed against the officer. While determining that
summary judgment was appropriate, the court explained:
An officer acts within the scope of his authority when he performs his
official duties - in this case, the enforcement of the traffic laws. The
fact that the officer's specific act that forms the basis of the suit may
have been wrong or negligent does not mean he was acting outside the
scope of his authority. . . . The enforcement of traffic regulations by
peace officers involves the exercise of their discretion. 25'
In light of the evidence, "the stop and brief detention would not have been
illegal, even if he had been mistaken. '252
In Boozier v. Hambrick253 a female airport police officer alleged that an
airport superintendent grabbed her buttocks. The superintendent sued the
airport officer for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and/or tortious interference with contract. Subsequent to the officer's report
246. Id. at 17; see TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.026 (Vernon 1993).
247. Newsom, 858 S.W.2d at 17.
248. Id. at 18.
249. Id.
250. 845 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, n.w.h.).
251. Id. at 453-54.
252. Id. at 454.
253. 846 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1993, n.w.h.).
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of this incident, the superintendent was convicted of assault. In determining
whether the officer was entitled to summary judgment, the court considered
whether her actions could be classified as quasi-judicial and whether she ac-
ted in good faith within her authority as a quasi-judicial employee. The
Houston Court of Appeals determined that "[w]hen a police officer reports
the misconduct of another to his or her superior ... the officer performs a
discretionary act."' 254 Secondly, based on the summary judgment proof
presented regarding the superintendent's conviction for assault, the superin-
tendent could not challenge the truthfulness of the officer's allegation.
Therefore, the plaintiff was estopped from denying the truthfulness of the
defendant's allegations. Since the plaintiff failed to present controverting ev-
idence of official immunity, summary judgment was proper. 255
254. Id. at 597.
255. Id. at 598.
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